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Abstract: Cloud providers are incorporating novel techniques to cope with prospective aspects of trading like resource
allocation over future demands and its pricing elasticity that was not foreseen before. To leverage the pricing
elasticity of upcoming demand and supply, we employ ﬁnancial option theory (future contracts) as a mech-
anism to alleviate the risk in resource allocation over future demands. This study introduces a novel Cloud
Asset Pricing Tree (CAPT) model that ﬁnds the optimal premium price of the Cloud federation options ef-
ﬁciently. Providers will beneﬁt by this model to make decisions when to buy options in advance and when
to exercise them to achieve more economies of scale. The CAPT model adapts its structure to address the
price elasticity concerns and makes the demand, price inelastic and the supply, price elastic. Our empirical
evidences suggest that using the CAPT model, exploits the Cloud market potential as an opportunity for more
resource utilization and future capacity planning.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud providers offer APIs associated with their pool
of conﬁgurable computing resources (e.g., virtual ma-
chines) so that clients can access and utilize them
by deploying their packages in runtime environments
(Kurze et al., 2011). In a Cloud market, the right
to beneﬁt from these pools of Cloud resources with
their utilization interfaces, can be delivered as “On-
Demand” or “Reserved” instances. For clients, the
reserved instances (RIs) are more reliable and eco-
nomic assets. As a proof, the unit of a resource be-
ing studied here is an Amazon EC2 Standard Small
Instance (US East) at a price1 of $0:060=hour for an
on-demand instance and for a reserved instance, costs
$0:034=hour with an upfront payment of $61=year,
which is almost half price. Therefore, ﬁnancially,
clients are more attracted to RIs. Faced with such
dilemma, RIs pose the concern of less future utiliza-
tion as far as it is not used by either the current or
other on-demand clients. This motivates providers to
take the opportunity to achieve more resource utiliza-
tion by keeping all instances in use. Providers may
reallocate unused RIs of current owner to other on-
demand clients to keep all resources utilized. This
1http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/pricing/
approach makes the RIs unavailable for the current
owner. Obviously, it is an obligation for providers
to assure the availability of RIs associated with own-
ers, otherwise, lack of resources leads to unmet de-
mands and, while reﬂecting the SLA violations, leads
to ﬁnancial consequences and penalties. To assure
asset availability when lacking resources, providers
can seek for more affordable and cost-efﬁcient Cloud
open markets to outsource their clients demands. In
addition to the fact that Cloud open marketplaces
(e.g., Zimory, SpotCloud) and federation offerings
(e.g., CloudKick, ScaleUp) offer more resource uti-
lization mechanisms, they also enable further cost
reduction due to the market competitive advantage
among providers.
The decision to outsource the request to the fed-
eration parties is relatively dependent to the asset’s
price. In a similar model, the Amazon Web Services
(AWS)alsoofferaspotinstancepricingmodel, where
the price ﬂuctuates as the market supply and demand
changes, and the spot instances will be provisioned
to the bidders who won the competition. As soon as
the asset’s spot price goes above the winning bid, re-
sources will be released. In open Cloud markets, the
providers hardly can rely on such mechanism since
there is no guarantee as they might lose the resources
when the asset price crosses their bid. In order to en-courage providers to beneﬁt from the Cloud market,
we need a dynamic economic model that keeps re-
sourceandﬁnancialelasticitysustainablybalancedby
controlling the asset price oscillation while demand
and supply ﬂuctuate. To this end, our contribution
is twofold: (i) Analyzing the ﬁnancial options and
pricing elasticity concepts in Cloud federation mar-
ket. (ii) The ﬂexible pricing model that calculates the
optimal premium price of the federation options efﬁ-
ciently and accurately.
The paper continues with a motivation scenario
in support of an elastic economic model for pric-
ing Cloud federation assets at section 2. Section 3
presents the basic concepts and preliminaries where
the conceptual basis and mathematical models are de-
tailed. Based on this, CAPT pricing model is derived
in section 4. We simulate and evaluate our CAPT
model and numerical results will be given in section 5
to support the efﬁciency of our model. Subsequently,
section 6 surveys related works. Finally, Section 7
concludes the paper and presents an outlook on future
research directions.
2 MOTIVATION
Along with elastic resource provisioning, providers
mayfacethelimitationsandinsufﬁciencyoftheirown
resource pool supply. In effect, they can transfer the
risk of lacking resources to the federation markets.
Federation markets can be of interest for providers
as well as for consumers. Clients may proﬁt from
lower costs and better performance, while providers
may offer more sophisticated services (Kurze et al.,
2011). However, hereinafter we focus on the provider
perspective. Thus providers can beneﬁt from the in-
creasingcapacityanddiversityoffederated resources.
In our model, we employ ﬁnancial option theory as an
interface to elastically allocate an extra pool of feder-
ated resources. In ﬁnance, an option2 is a contract
which gives the buyer (the owner) the right, but not
the obligation, to buy or sell an underlying asset or
instrument at a speciﬁed strike price on or before a
speciﬁed date.
Pricing elasticity and resource trading among fed-
eration members lead to competitive contracting pro-
cess, which aims at ﬁnding reasonable and fair price
of the asset. The contracting process is to write an
option that contains future aspects of trading. For in-
stance, whenever the provider lacks the required re-
sources, then can take advantage of exercising such
options to allocate corresponding resources respec-
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Option (ﬁnance)
tively. Using options, providers take the rights to pro-
vision seller’s resources which match their demands
among parties at a price equal or above to their expec-
tation of the asset payoff. Now, the concern is, how
to price an option to be reasonable for both parties?
Obviously, option pricing is an elastic process (Dust-
dar et al., 2011), sensitive to the ﬂuctuation of the as-
set price determined by supply and demand between
federation parties in spot market. As a consequence,
pricing elasticity that comes in two types of Demand
and Provisioning may drive a wedge between the buy-
ing and selling price of an asset. Thus controlling the
pricing elasticity of the demand and provisioning with
respect to their effects on revenue stream by fair pric-
ing of such options appears to be vital. This paper
aims at addressing the pricing elasticity of the asset in
federation market by fair pricing of the option. The
option price is determined by a broker acting on be-
half of the Cloud federation and therefore standard-
ised across the federation. This option gives the right
to obtain an instance at a given price, established at
the agreement’s stipulation time.
In this scenario, at stage 1 as shown in Fig. 1, the
clients request for on-demand and RIs and keep using
them. At stage 2 another client beneﬁts from the ex-
isting RI. As soon as the RI is suspended, Provider
A can utilize this instance by reallocating it to un-
met on-demand request. Therefore, upon lacking re-
sources, any incoming on-demand request at stage 3
will be responded by reallocation of the RI at 4 to
a new client. At this moment, stage 5, Provider A
buys an option from federation broker as a support-
ing mechanism for future resource capacity planning.
The provider avoids buying resources at a price that is
higher than the one charged to its own customers. As
soonasthepreviousclientclaimsfortheRIat6which
isnowallocatedtotherequest3, theproviderwilltake
advantage of the option signed with Provider B by ex-
ercising it at 7 and the Provider B has an obligation to
provision the promised resources at 8. Our focus lies
on stages 5 and 7 where the provider is looking for
a well priced option to be exercised later to achieve
more utilization. In our federation model, Provider A
is the demander and Providers B & C are the resource
suppliers in the federated environment.
The fact that future valuation of federated assets
depends on the correlated elasticity between provi-
sioning and demand, suggests that the optimal utiliza-
tion of an asset is primarily driven by its price volatil-
ity in open Cloud markets. This inﬂuences the trend
of providers to be more concentrated on controlling
this pricing elasticity. Although the elasticity of a
demand is an initial impetus in asset valuation, the
pricing elasticity of the demand might lead to inefﬁ-Figure 1: Resource utilization in Cloud federation using options.
cient revenue generation. For instance, the resource
demand can be affected to a greater degree by minor
changes in asset price. This leads to a question, how
can volatility in price cause so much sensitivity in fu-
ture demands? The reason is ampliﬁcation. Blame
is usually laid on asset price ﬂuctuation and dynamic
valuation. The price changes in federation market
will be propagated across providers (such as domino
effects), causing more sensitivity and concerns on
provider’s demand. The next question is, how can
we control the pricing elasticity and decrease Cloud
market sensitivity to future asset price changes? In
this study we employ ﬁnancial option theory which
takes care of future valuation of the asset. Then by us-
ing the Binomial-Trinomial Tree (BTT) option pric-
ing (shyr Dai and dauh Lyuu, 2010) methodology, we
control the Cloud asset price changes and its propaga-
tion through the market. As the option price rises or
falls, our CAPT model will adjust its structure to the
price volatility to come up with an option price that is
predictable and fair for both option holder and writer.
3 TERMS AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section we present basic concepts, economic
terms and numerical methods and their interpretations
considered in the study.
3.1 Cloud Federation Contracts
In ﬁnance, an option is a contract but the major dif-
ference arise from the rights and obligations of an op-
tion’s buyer and seller. A Call option gives the buyer
theright, butnottheobligation, topurchasetheunder-
lying asset at a speciﬁed price (the strike or exercise
price) during the life of the option. The cost of ob-
taining this right is known as the option’s ”premium”
which is the price that is offered in the exchange. We
use the term premium for an option premium in this
study. The option buyer’s loss is limited to the pre-
mium paid. When you own a Call, what you do by ex-
ercising your right is to Call for Resource Provision-
ing from provider that offered the Call to you. The
buyer’s right becomes the seller’s obligation when the
option is exercised. An American option can be exer-
cised at any time during the life of the contract while
European option can only be exercised at maturity
date. The CAPT is modeled with American call op-
tions.
American options are provided by a pool of
providers and purchased by other providers as a hedge
to cover potential excess demand. Using this method,
providersareabletore-sellon-demandVMsthathave
previously been sold as RI. If the RI owner decides to
use the instance then rather than violate an SLA, the
excess demand can be covered by exercising previ-
ously purchased options to enable Cloud-bursting us-
ing the federated pool of resources. The option pric-
ing model determines an option price that is inelastic
(such that supply and demand are not highly sensitive
to price), thereby reducing self-reinforcing oscilla-
tions in supply and demand. The paper demonstrates
that the option pricing model converges to a more
stable price over time and the simulated provider in-
creases proﬁt from outsourcing provisioning using
options.
3.2 Cloud Asset Pricing Elasticity
In Cloud systems, elasticity is the ability to automat-
ically increase or decrease resource allocation to as-
set instances as demand ﬂuctuates. Cloud ﬁnancial
elasticity is a measure of how much resource buyers
and sellers respond to changes in market conditions.
It’s a measure of the responsiveness of quantity de-
manded or provisioned to a change in one of its deter-
minants like price or quality. In this paper we address
the Cloud federation asset pricing elasticity. The lawof demand states that a fall in the price of a resource
raises the quantity demanded. To be more speciﬁc,
the price elasticity of demand measures how willing
providers are to buy less or more options as its price
rises or falls. To sum up, the concept of Price Elastic-
ity of Demand (PEoD) measures of how much the re-
source quantity demanded due to a price change. And
the Price Elasticity of Provisioning (PEoP) measures
how much the resource quantity provisioned due to a
price change (Mankiw, 2012). The PEoD and PEoP
formulas are:
PEoD =
(%Change in Quantity Demanded)
(%Change in Price)
(1)
PEoP =
(%Change in Quantity Provisioned)
(%Change in Price)
(2)
3.3 Pricing Elasticity Interpretation
Regarding interpretation, we analyze the Cloud asset
price elasticity only with their absolute values. The
PEoD variable values, denote how sensitive the de-
mand for an asset is to a price change. In ﬁnancial
markets, the rule is if a provider’s asset has a high
elasticity of demand, the more the price goes up, the
fewer consumers will buy and try to economise their
needs. Correspondingly, in Cloud federation markets,
a very high price elasticity suggests that when the
price of a resource goes up, our provider will be more
sensitive and demand for less assets or buy less call
options. Conversely, when the price of that resource
goes down, then the provider will demand for more
assets or buy more call options. A very low price elas-
ticity implies just the opposite, that changes in price
have little inﬂuence on demand or exercising the call.
To sum up, when demand is price inelastic, total rev-
enue moves in the direction of a price change. When
demand is price unit elastic, total revenue does not
change in response to a price change. When demand
is price elastic, total revenue moves in the direction of
a quantity change. In order to see whether the price is
elastic or inelastic we use the following rule of thumb:
VM PEoD =
8
> <
> :
>1 Demand is price elastic.
=1 Demand is unit elastic.
<1 Demand is price inelastic.
(3)
Next is price elasticity of provisioning in federa-
tion resource supply pool. The law of supply states
that higher prices raise the quantity supplied. The
price elasticity of supply measures how much the
quantity supplied responds to changes in the price.
Supply of a good is said to be elastic if the quan-
tity supplied responds substantially to changes in the
price. Supply is said to be inelastic if the quantity sup-
plied responds only slightly to changes in the price.
PEoP denotes how sensitive the provisioning of an as-
setistoapricechange. InCloudfederationmarkets, a
very high price elasticity of provisioning suggests that
when the price of a resource goes up, Cloud federa-
tion members will be more sensitive to price changes
and provision more assets or sell more call options
to make more proﬁt. Thus, the resource quantity
supplied can respond substantially to price changes.
Same as PEoD, in order to see whether the price is
elastic or inelastic in PEoP, we use the following rule
of thumb:
VM PEoP =
8
> <
> :
>1 Provisioning is price elastic.
=1 Provisioning is unit elastic.
<1 Provisioning is price inelastic.
(4)
Finding the right balance between these two po-
lar approaches of PEoD and PEoP to come to a new
equilibrium is a challenge as we address it using our
CAPT model. In equilibrium, asset aggregate demand
has to equal the asset supply. To be more speciﬁc, in
our evaluation, we will show that our pricing model,
calculates the fair price of the option that makes the
demand, price inelastic and provisioning, price elas-
tic. This leads to increasing demand, regardless of the
asset price oscillation.
3.4 Assumptions
It is an indication that the following assumptions un-
derlying our model has been considered for the proper
positioningofthisstudy. InaCloudmarket, resources
are virtualized to abstract concepts like virtual ma-
chines (VMs) and assumed as intangible assets. They
are also seen as assets as long as associated with a
contract that can be exercised by an option. Fed-
eration formation pose some concerns like contract
management, data policies, SLA violations and etc.
We believe these concerns should be addressed in the
business models agreed among parties.
4 CAPT MODEL
The option pricing can be represented by numeri-
calmethodsliketrees. Thissectionshowshowtogen-
erate the CAPT tree for pricing options. The model
beneﬁts from the Binomial and Trinomial tree meth-
ods as detailed below. This section shows how to gen-
erate the CAPT tree for pricing options.4.1 Binomial Tree
Binomial tree model is a numerical pricing method
that approximates option price. Let a derivative on
S(t) initiates at time 0 and matures at time T. A lattice
partitions this time span into n equal-distanced time
steps and speciﬁes the value of S(t) at each time step
which denotes the Cloud asset price. Let the length
between two adjacent time steps be Dt T=n. The es-
tablished Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) binomial tree
(Cox et al., 1979) is shown in Fig. 2. As we move
forward in time, each asset price S can either move
upward to become Su with probability Pu, or move
downward to become Sd with probability Pd 1 Pu.
The CRR lattice adopts the following solution:
u = es
p
Dt;d = e s
p
Dt;Pu =
erDt  d
u d
;Pd =
erDt  u
d u
(5)
Where s is price volatility, Dt is duration of a step and
r denotes the interest rate.
Figure 2: CRR Binomial Pricing Tree.
4.2 Trinomial Tree
A trinomial tree can be built in a similar way to the
binomial tree but has three possible paths (up, down,
and stable) per node leading to more efﬁcient pricing.
The jump sizes (u, d) can be calculated in a similar
way with doubled time spacing. The transition prob-
abilities are given as:
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Pm = 1 Pu Pd (7)
Now it is possible to ﬁnd the value of the underly-
ing asset, S for any sequence of price movements. It
will generate a directed graph with nodes labeled as
asset prices and edges connecting nodes separated by
one time step and a single price up, down and middle
jumps as Nu;Nd;Nm , where the price after i period
at node j (or after i ups and j downs) is given by:
S(i;j) = uNudNdmNmS(t0) where Nu+Nd +Nm = i. Fi-
nally, inbothbinomialandtrinomialtreemethods, the
option value can be computed by standard backward
induction method.
4.3 Growing the CAPT Tree
This section visualizes how the BTT tree is con-
structed for pricing the options brieﬂy. In this model
as illustrated in Fig. 3 the root of the tree is the node
S which is formed by a trinomial tree and the rest of
the tree is constructed using binomial method with the
ﬁrst two time steps truncated. The barriers (the black
nodes) are H0 and L0 at time T0 and H1 and L1 at time
T0+T1. These barriers deﬁne the allowable range for
the price ﬂuctuation of the underlying asset serving
to limit both, proﬁts and losses, for federation parties.
The tree adjusts and adapts its structure to the price
volatility and the moving barriers to come up with an
option price that is predictable and fair for both option
holder and writer.
Figure 3: Cloud Option Pricing using Bino-Trinomial Tree.
The combinatorial pricing algorithm (Dai and
Lyuu, 2007) is used to evaluate the option values on
the three CRR trees as shown in Fig. 3, with root
nodes A, B, and C. The option price of the CAPT atnode S is also evaluated by the backward induction
method.
5 Model Evaluation
Now, we present results from our simulation obser-
vation that show the efﬁciency of our model. We
have implemented a Cloud federation environment
using Cloud simulation platform, CloudSim (Cal-
heiros et al., 2011). The simulated Cloud federation
uses our option pricing model for trading assets and
VM provisioning. The unit of resource being ob-
served is an Amazon EC2 Standard Small Instance
(US East). At the date of simulation (Sept 2013), re-
sources advertised at a price of $0:085=hour for an
on-demand instance. For RIs, the same type instance
for 12 months costs $0:034=hour. For evaluation pur-
poses, (i) the reserved capacity of the data center is
considered as steady constant value during simula-
tion. (ii) to economize the equations, we do not take
into account the operational costs (i.e., hardware and
software acquisition, staff salary, power consumption,
cooling costs, physical space, etc.) of the data center.
It imposes a constant value within the model.
5.1 Simulation Setup
The simulation environment is developed to capture
the behavior of our CAPT model in Cloud federation
where supply and demand ﬂuctuate in daily patterns
directly inspiredby real-world market. For aprovider,
who beneﬁts from this market, simulation was im-
plemented with a resource pool capable of 400 si-
multaneous running VMs capacity including reserved
and on-demand. We have implemented the following
three components on top of CloudSim simulator. Fur-
ther details of our option-based federation simulator
entities and settings are as follows.
5.1.1 CAPT Request Generator (ReqG)
The workload pattern generation was needed in order
to mimic the real world IaaS Cloud requests. We im-
plemented CAPT-ReqG agent to create jobs by using
the Cloudlet class in CloudSim. In our model, each
job has an arrival time as we scheduled the workload
on a daily-basis pattern and a duration time which is
the holding time of the instance by the job and me-
tered to charge the consumer respectively. Given that
our workload follows daily pattern based on normal
Gaussian distribution for the 24 hours of a day and
considering standard business hours (from 9 to 17) as
peak hours, we generate a randomly distributed ar-
rival time for requests in each speciﬁc hour. The load
decreased 60% on weekends.
5.1.2 CAPT Resource Allocator (ResA)
We have developed the CAPT-ResA agent to deter-
mine the association between jobs and federated re-
sources. Our allocation policy ﬁnds a mapping be-
tween the batch of jobs outsourced to the federation
and VMs associated to options. In the simulation, the
VM provisioning policy is extended to best ﬁt with
respect to the option status. The providers are im-
plemented using DataCenter class in CloudSim, as it
behaves like an IaaS provider. The CAPT-ResA re-
ceives requests from CAPT-ReqG, allocates resources
and binds the jobs to the VMs accordingly. For re-
source allocation, we have used shared pool strategy.
In case of arriving a new on-demand job, the agent
checks if the number of currently running on-demand
jobs exceeds the capacity of on-demand pool and if
so, it will allocate VMs from its reserved pool while
buying an option from federated Cloud. As soon as
it receives requests which can not be met in-house,
the agent will exercise the options that were bought
before and outsource the new jobs to federated pool.
5.1.3 CAPT Option Handler (OptH)
Our CAPT-OptH agent implements the option pric-
ing model as detailed in section 4. It also routes the
option exercising request to the CAPT-ResA agent to
have the requested resource provisioned. The pricing
policy is set to resource/hour consumed for each in-
stance, for the duration an instance is launched till it
is terminated. Each partial resource/hour consumed
will be charged as a full hour. There are six metrics
that affect the CAPT option pricing, (i) the current
stock price, S0 set to $0:034=hour (ii) the exercise
price (spot price), K is generated based on Amazon
spot price observed pattern. (iii) the time to option
expiration T set to 1 month (iv) the volatility s which
is the range and speed in which a price moves, set
to 31:40%per annum. It is observed by the cloudex-
change.org3 which is real-time monitoring of Ama-
zon EC2 spot prices. (v) the interest rate, r is set to
19:56% per annum since the Amazon EC2 SLA4 in-
terest rate is 1:5% per month and (vi) the dividend
expected during the life of the option is set to $5:17.
Both High and Low barriers are set to $0:039 and
$0:030. The simulation was run 50 times. The exper-
iment duration is set to 6 months and the mean value
3https://github.com/tlossen/cloudexchange.org
4http://aws.amazon.com/agreement/of the results is evaluated to mimic the real-world en-
vironment.
5.2 Evaluation Measure
There are four empirical measures as we care to spec-
ify and observe their behavior during the simulation:
(i) Provider’s proﬁt (Ppr), which our model claims
to ensure the optimal utilization of the resources for
providers. The proﬁt measurement equation is:
Ppr = Ron+Rres+R(op;exe) C(op;pre) C(gen) (8)
where Ron and Rres are the providers’ total revenue
received over their own on-demand and RIs. R(op;exe)
is the revenue of exercising the options since the op-
tion exercise price is less than their own instance price
sold to their clients before. C(op;pre) denotes the pre-
mium to be paid for the purchase of the option which
our model calculates accurately. Finally, C(gen) cov-
ers general costs of provider as we assumed a con-
stant value. (ii) Second measure is QoS Violations
(QoSv), that holds the number of rejected or unmet
reserved and on-demand instances reﬂecting the SLA
violations. Third and forth measures are (iii) Price
Elasticity of Demand (eD) and (iv) Price Elasticity
of Provisioning (eP) where their absolute values are
highly correlated with the asset price changes. Their
computation is done with these equations:
eD(vm) =
%DQd
%DPvm
and eP(vm) =
%DQp
%DPvm
(9)
The eD(vm) and eP(vm) denote the price elasticity
of demand and provisioning of an asset, and mea-
sures the percentage change in the quantity of VM de-
manded and provisioned per 1% change in the price
of its option premium. Our economic model should
make eD(vm) “price inelastic” and eP(vm) “price
elastic” as interpreted in section 3:2.
5.3 Results and Debate
The aggregate results imply utility and are reported
as summary in Table 1. Results show that those
providers are able to reach an utilization rate of 99%
and achieve gains both from the in-house instances
and from those obtained by exercising the option’s
rights from other providers of the federation. Tak-
ing these results together, four points stand out in this
simulation. First, is the proﬁt made from exercising
options. To interpret this, note that in our approach,
providers buy the options that its exercise price are
less than their own VM provisioning price. As ob-
served, providers were able to meet 86% of an incom-
ing requests by inhouse provisioning and outsourced
14% of their demands to the federation, in which
are fully provisioned to celebrating 8:7% more proﬁt.
Second, is the achievement over the QoS agreed with
the client for resource delivery. For both reserved
and on-demand, no QoS violation (no unmet request)
is detected. Third, as our results indicate, the value
of pricing elasticity of demand (PEoD) is kept less
than 1 denoting that the demand became “price in-
elastic” serving to increasing demand, regardless of
the asset price oscillation. From the federation per-
spective (resource suppliers side), the value of pric-
ing elasticity of provisioning (PEoP) is more than 1
denoting that the provisioning became “price elas-
tic” indicating the providers are ﬂexible enough to
adapt the amount of resources they provision. These
values are consistent with the number of options pur-
chased and exercised, leading to more economies of
scale. Finally, is the utilization value, which is con-
siderable. This indicates that optimal utilization of
resources is achieved to exploit the efﬁciency and ac-
curacy of our model.
To form a basis for comparison, our next two ﬁg-
ures depict the dependencies between option pricing
elasticity and its demand and provisioning. Fig. 4,
shows how CAPT controls the option pricing elastic-
ity and converges to a more stable price smoothly.
Our approach ﬁnds the optimal option price of the
federated resource in the Cloud to come to an equilib-
rium between PEoD and PEoP. The asset equilibrium
price occurs when the supply resource pool matches
the aggregate demand indicating an optimal resource
utilization. From the provisioning perspective, as
shown in Fig. 5, it can be seen, that a 21% increase
(using midpoint method) in the asset price leads to a
35% increase in quantity provisioned. This indicates
an elastic supply. Since the asset pricing elasticity is
controlled, we see a synchronous correlation between
price and supply changes. As a result, the total rev-
enue moves in the direction of price change.
Figure 4: Resource price elasticity controlled via options.Table 1: Cloud federation market simulation summary (6 months).
QoS Violations Proﬁt Price Elasticity Options
Market# Measures ! Workload Utilization Reserved On-demand In-house Option PEoD PEoP Bought Exercised
Cloud Federation Market 98455 99% 0 0 35293:63 3339:97 0:095 1:28 25676 14020
Figure 5: Price elasticity of resources provisioned.
6 RELATED WORK
In relation to our approach, there are some alterna-
tives that propose federation economic model more
focused on the provider’s perspective. A broker-based
federation approach has been proposed by (Villegas
etal., 2012), (RogersandCliff, 2012)and(Raj, 2011).
These studies decouple the brokerage strategies and
federation economic valuation. Zhang proposes an
economic model for the evaluation of the economic
value of Cloud Computing Federation in providing
one computing unit such as the power and human
resources (Zhang and Zhang, 2012). Just as Clouds
enable users to cope with unexpected demand loads,
a Federated Cloud will enable individual Clouds to
cope with unforeseen variations of demand. Authors
in (Gomes et al., 2012) investigate the application
of market-oriented mechanisms based on the General
Equilibrium Theory of Microeconomics to coordinate
the sharing of resources between the Clouds in the
federated environment. In (Zhao et al., 2012), au-
thors present an online resource marketplace for open
Clouds by adopting an eBay style transaction model
based on auction theory. Here (Samaan, 2013) es-
tablishes a novel economic sharing model to regu-
late capacity sharing in a federation of hybrid Cloud
providers. The idea of ﬁnancial options is used by
(Sharma et al., 2012) as a ﬁnancial model for pricing
CloudcomputecommoditiesbyusingMoore’slawon
depreciation of asset values, to show the effect of de-
preciation of Cloud resource on QoS. In (Toosi et al.,
2012) authors incorporate ﬁnancial options as a mar-
ket model for federated Cloud environments. In con-
trast to existing approaches, we use ﬁnancial option
theory for asset trading and propose a dynamic and
adaptive option pricing model which enhance proﬁt
by controlling the pricing elasticity of demand and
provisioning in the Cloud federation.
7 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Providers consider federations as an alternative pool
of resources to their expected consumption growth.
Their demand to use the federated asset is dependent
to the pricing elasticity of demand, as if the elastic-
ity is high, then they will be more careful on buy-
ing options. In this paper, we proposed a ﬁnancial
option pricing model to address the pricing elasticity
concerns in above situation. Our economical model
is for implementing a future market of virtualized
resources in a system where a federation of Cloud
providers is used to reduce risks and costs associ-
ated with the capacity planning of Cloud providers.
Providers will beneﬁt by this model to make decisions
when to buy options in advance and when to exercise
them to achieve more economies of scale.
So far, we have proposed an economic model that
considers future aspects of trading like capacity plan-
ning or resource allocation over upcoming demands.
The CAPT model empowers vendors to get addi-
tional resources as and when required. This economic
model aims for the leverage of demand and supply
form the IaaS provider and third party providers point
of view, ﬁnding suboptimal price policies between re-
sources ownered by the provider and options to ex-
ternal providers using Cloud bursting when needed.
This study covers two aspects of resource elasticity:
Resource Quantity and Price. As an outlook, our fu-
ture work includes further extension to the model that
can also support the Quality of Service (QoS) aspect
in federation environment.REFERENCES
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